OK, so I’m finally ready to continue. This may or may not be a logical place to start – but I did want to focus on explaining some of the basic concepts before trying to make something out of them, and so I’m going to begin by considering the Gestalt view of the structure of the psyche.
I’ve always found theories mapping the psyche into distinct parts, like Freud’s id, ego, and superego, to be a bit slippery. If you look for these distinctions in your own mind, it’s usually possible to find at least some evidence for pretty much any theory, but I’ve never found any of them to really “click”. Just dividing the mind into conscious, preconscious, and unconscious regions is unobjectionable, and may be useful for some purposes, but it doesn’t actually lead to a better understanding of how it works, except by emphasizing that we aren’t aware of everything that’s there at any given time, and that there’s probably a lot there that has doesn’t regularly (or ever) enter awareness.
In contrast to mapping the psyche functionally, or based on the relative level of awareness of mental contents, Gestalt psychology considers the psyche to structure itself in various ways in response to stimuli – for example, one’s intentions or external situations. All of these temporary configurations can be understood using the concept of figure and ground: various parts of ourselves are brought into focus as they become relevant, or else they fade into the background, where we are aware of them only in a vague way, if at all.
(tldr; The psyche only has particular structures situationally: they are not a permanent feature.)
The concept of figure and ground is a bit easier to understand when considering sight or hearing: it means that we perceive one or several elements to be central and the rest as peripheral to them. This does not happen in a static way, but in a fluid, shifting one that is dependent on factors such as our own interests, desires, or the presence of something new or unusual in our environment. If you’re very hungry when entering a restaurant, you may not even notice its decor until you’ve eaten something. If you’re listening to a piece of music and an instrument you play enters, that’s likely to be the focus of your attention even if it’s not playing the melody. This is essentially the basis for the concept of state tests as well: things that “don’t belong” naturally stick out to us, and what we’re doing when we perform one is making the connection between “this isn’t something that would normally happen in this kind of a situation” and “I might be dreaming”.
This is the case for thought, one’s “conceptual sense”, as well as sight, hearing, and the other senses. This idea may be a bit difficult to grasp if it’s new to you, but it’s easily testable in one’s own experience of external reality. That reaction of seeing something that does not belong and thus attracts our attention is clearly a conceptual reaction as well as one of sight; there’s just no reason to schematize our reactions and separate out their various elements most of the time. It’s also worth mentioning that Buddhist philosophy has traditionally considered thought as a sense alongside the usual five, and it should also be a familiar idea if you’ve read ETWOLD (see Chapter 5!), although its role in perception is assumed there rather than stated explicitly.
It’s a little more difficult to catch your own mind in the act – to be aware of what exactly is happening as you take on various attitudes, roles, and mental stances and see the various combinations of figure and ground – but it’s a worthwhile exercise. And it is quite possible for noticing something is odd about your own thoughts to lead to a lucid dream, just as noticing environmental oddities can.
(tldr; Perception, which is always colored by thoughts, takes the form of figure and ground, with some parts sticking out to us and others fading into the background.)
I find this is a much more intuitive way of considering the structure of the psyche: as entirely situation-dependent. There are some situations where it may make sense to consider it in terms of conscious vs. unconscious (particularly while dreaming) and others where distinctions such as superego vs. ego or ego vs. shadow might be appropriate. These are temporary configurations or patterns that become habitual, and the degree to which they resonate with us will tend to depend on the sorts of situations or conflicts that are typical for us.
That part about conflicts is actually a major limitation of the better-known ways of dividing of the psyche. Freud formulated his model of the psyche based on the sorts of inner conflicts he saw his patients experiencing. Plato does something very similar in the Republic: he posits different parts of the psyche based on the various ways people can be in conflict with themselves. However, people aren’t always in a state of conflict in which they experience themselves as having various “parts”. And most of us (with the notable exception of Freud) would probably agree that inner conflict is not a natural state to be in. Do those parts still exist when we’re not feeling divided? We would have trouble finding them when introspecting – and I think I can safely say that they’re not discoverable by experience except by actually summoning up a compelling inner conflict or experimentally placing ourselves in the right kind of situation. When they make up the figure, they’re parts; when they’re part of the background, they’re not.
Introspection as a method is subject to similar limitations in that, when you’re examining your own psyche, it is not from a neutral observation post: it’s you who’s considering you, and so you’re actually introducing another type of division. This split is not a permanent feature of the mind either, and the sort of self-awareness that is characterized by taking on the role of a “watcher” is not the only kind that’s possible. (Note: This is something I’ll probably be returning to at some point since it’s highly relevant for various methods of attaining and maintaining lucidity, and mistaking one sort of self-awareness for another may be the source of some difficulties).
In the mind’s optimal state of functioning, these systems of figure and ground – the Gestalts, or wholes, of Gestalt psychology – are free to develop out of the basic unity of mind, body, and environment, with anything capable of becoming figure, and the figure being in focus and clearly distinguishable from the background. However, there are various habits of thought and perception that disturb this relationship and prevent certain things from coming into focus, or prevent any figure from coming fully into focus. This is where the methods of Gestalt psychology come into play: not with the goal of establishing some sort of theoretically harmonious relationship among the various parts of one’s mind, but rather troubleshooting the various problems that prevent this entirely natural thing from happening.
Interestingly, Perls seems to regard this state in which this process is allowed to take place undisturbed as being the same as the end-point of what Jung calls integration. This would also be something worth following up on, since it’s easy to see how this could be the case, but Jung is coming at it from a different enough angle to where it isn’t immediately obvious that there aren’t any important differences.
(tldr; Other approaches to this question are characterized by various limitations as their methods tend to introduce artificial divisions into what is essentially a unity.)
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