Thread: Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

#3 This assumes that existence is an intrinsic property of greatness.
#4 It ignores the possibility that there's a 'greater' God that is being comprehension of a human or other sapient mind, and erroneously ties in 'greatness' as a function of human mentality, rather than an intrinsic property. 'Greatness' is either an arbitrary human concept which has no value, or if it's objectively definable then unjustifiable limits are being imposed on it by the premise.
#5 Simple logic error, since just because it's possible to conceive of a god more powerful than an imaginary one, it does not therefore follow that therefore such a god exists.

#5 is where it really falls apart, since it doesn't follow regardless of whether #1-4 are true or not.

You already admitted that it isn't true, and we already proved that it is a flawed way of thinking with the fukshit example. You keep saying the definition doesn't matter, but that is totally untrue. An argument is only valid if the premise is also valid, and in this case the premise is an ambiguous definition. Which is my point, if you place in a non-ambiguous definition it stops working, because the argument relies on the ambiguity of the definition.

People don't even know what you are talking about when you say greatest. Are you talking about greatest in size? It seems to be, because it says an idea is greater in size if it takes up both the mind and reality. However, that makes no sense when talking about an idea that is being conceived and that has no size.

5 follows as the result of a very simple logical inference from 2 and 4 (which has been explained a couple of times now). 4 follows trivially from 3. The argument does not say anything about, and does not assume anything about, beings which are greater than we can conceive. I left most of the reasoning behind the steps tacit because I thought things like "X or Y and not Y implies X" were simple enough to follow, but apparently it's less lucid than I thought so I'll explicate them now:

1. The idea of God exists in the mind (we can conceive of God by definition).
2. God exists in reality or God does not exist in reality.
3. Thus, God either exists in the mind alone, or, in the mind and reality (from 1 and 2).
4. It is greater to exist in the mind and reality rather than the mind alone.
5. If God exists in the mind alone, we can conceive a greater being than God, which exists in the mind and reality (from 4).
6. This is a contradiction of the definition of God.
7. Therefore God does not exist in the mind alone (from 5 and 6).
8. Thus, God exists in the mind and reality (from 3 and 7).
9. Thus, God exists in reality (from 8).

Originally Posted by Photolysis

#3 This assumes that existence is an intrinsic property of greatness.

Isn't it? At the very least there are various elucidations of greatness which make the argument sound, as I detailed previously. "Occupying larger domains of existence", for instance, or "being able to effect larger change in reality".

Originally Posted by Alric

You already admitted that it isn't true, and we already proved that it is a flawed way of thinking with the fukshit example. You keep saying the definition doesn't matter, but that is totally untrue. An argument is only valid if the premise is also valid and in this case the premise is an ambiguous definition.

This is nonsense, definitions are not premises. A premise is a proposition used to give a conclusion through a syllogism. A proposition is something of which truth or falsity can be asserted.

Which is my point, if you place in a non-ambiguous definition it stops working, because the argument relies on the ambiguity of the definition.

People don't even know what you are talking about when you say greatest. Are you talking about greatest in size? It seems to be, because it says an idea is greater in size if it takes up both the mind and reality. However, that makes no sense when talking about an idea that is being conceived and that has no size.

I've already responded to this, including providing several definitions which make premiss 3, "it is greater to exist in the mind and reality rather than the mind alone", sound, and thus the argument sound as a whole.

Originally Posted by Xei

1. The idea of God exists in the mind (we can conceive of God by definition).
2. God exists in reality or God does not exist in reality.
3. Thus, God either exists in the mind alone, or, in the mind and reality (from 1 and 2).
4. It is greater to exist in the mind and reality rather than the mind alone.
5. If God exists in the mind alone, we can conceive a greater being than God, which exists in the mind and reality (from 4).
6. This is a contradiction of the definition of God.
7. Therefore God does not exist in the mind alone (from 5 and 6).
8. Thus, God exists in the mind and reality (from 3 and 7).
9. Thus, God exists in reality (from 8).

Fine, to use this modified version.

#1 Begs the question (but as was originally presented it can't be challenged).
#6 There is no contradiction; all it actually means is that if a god existed as defined, then it would have to exist, instead of being imaginary. Of course this tells you nothing useful. At no point does this ever allow anyone to make the leap to "therefore god exists".

To annotate it:

Originally Posted by Xei

1. The idea of God exists in the mind (we can conceive of God by definition). We can imagine god
2. God exists in reality or God does not exist in reality. God is real or not
3. Thus, God either exists in the mind alone, or, in the mind and reality (from 1 and 2). God is either real or not, and can be imagined
4. It is greater to exist in the mind and reality rather than the mind alone. Real things are better than imaginary things
5. If God exists in the mind alone, we can conceive a greater being than God, which exists in the mind and reality (from 4). To be the greatest, a god would have to exist
6. This is a contradiction of the definition of God. This is incorrect. It's still conditional on there being a god in the first place. This would only be a contradiction if god existed but was imaginary, which is already self-contradicting on the basis of existence, before one considers 'greatness'.
7. Therefore God does not exist in the mind alone (from 5 and 6). This does not follow as true, it only follows if a god exists, telling you nothing
8. Thus, God exists in the mind and reality (from 3 and 7). Invalid conclusion
9. Thus, God exists in reality (from 8). Invalid conclusion

Isn't it? At the very least there are various elucidations of greatness which make the argument sound, as I detailed previously. "Occupying larger domains of existence", for instance, or "being able to effect larger change in reality".

I didn't read anything other than the OP. You could define greatness in such a way for whatever little it's worth (nothing in my opinion), but the original argument doesn't define it.

6 is fine. 'God' is defined as the greatest conceivable being. Conceiving a greater being than 'God' is therefore impossible. This inference doesn't require God to exist.

5-7 is establishing a lemma by reductio ad absurdum. To explicate it even further:

a. Assume God exists in the mind alone.
b. We can conceive a greater being than God (one which also exists in reality, see 4).
c. God is not the greatest conceivable being (from b).
d. God is the greatest conceivable being (by definition).
e. Contradiction (from c and d).
f. Our assumption, a, is false.

Originally Posted by Xei

2. Thus, God either exists in the mind alone, or in the mind and reality.

I don't know a thing about formal logic, but to me the break is here - the god that 'exists' in the mind is only an idea about a god, and not at all the same thing as an actual entity.

I think that's exactly right. The argument cleverly conflates 'God' and 'the idea of God'. It does this by talking of God 'existing in the mind'. But this is not the case. Only the conception of God exists in the mind. This is utterly different from God existing in the mind. As an analogy, consider the difference between the statements "the conception of a chair exists in the mind" and "a chair exists in the mind". The first is true. The second is false.

So 2 is wrong. It should say, "either the idea of God exists in the mind and God does not exist in reality, or the idea of God exists in the mind and God does exist in reality". The rest of the argument then fails to go through.

Ah, there it is:
Premise: Existence therefore Greatness. (4)
Conclusion: Greatness therefore Existence.

Yeah, that's a converse error if I ever saw one. Fallacious structure (affirming the consequent), therefore invalid argument. Man that was hidden well.

Originally Posted by Xei

I think that's exactly right. The argument cleverly conflates 'God' and 'the idea of God'. It does this by talking of God 'existing in the mind'. But this is not the case. Only the conception of God exists in the mind. This is utterly different from God existing in the mind. As an analogy, consider the difference between the statements "the conception of a chair exists in the mind" and "a chair exists in the mind". The first is true. The second is false.

So 2 is wrong. It should say, "either the idea of God exists in the mind and God does not exist in reality, or the idea of God exists in the mind and God does exist in reality". The rest of the argument then fails to go through.

Isn't that exactly what I just said, when I said the definition was ambiguous? As in there is multiple possible meanings of the word, and at least two are used in the argument, god being a concept and god not being a concept but a physical object.

I don't recall you saying that 'God' was used to mean 'God' and 'the concept of God'. You made various criticisms of the term, but if that was one of them, I missed it.

Originally Posted by SuperOhm

Ah, there it is:
Premise: Existence therefore Greatness. (4)
Conclusion: Greatness therefore Existence.

Yeah, that's a converse error if I ever saw one. Fallacious structure (affirming the consequent), therefore invalid argument. Man that was hidden well.

I'm not sure that that's the problem with Anselm... at the very least I don't think the inference of 4 can be described as 'existence therefore greatness'.

When I said the argument doesn't go through after Darkmatters' refutation, that was an oversimplification. It kinda does still go through, but with a lot of redundant premises and inferences. It basically boils down to the following argument. This was Descartes' version, which seems to have inspired most philosophical discussion, including analyses by Hume and Kant. It was also taken up by Godel, the greatest logician to ever live, who turned it into a formal mathematical argument. Again it seems obviously mistaken, and one can modify it to reach absurd conclusions, but it's rather hard to pin down why it doesn't meet our usual criteria of valid argumentation. Godel's in particular was a formal symbolic proof which could be mathematically checked, although this isn't uncontentious.

Descartes' Ontological Argument

Define 'God' to be the greatest conceivable being.

1. Either God exists or God does not exist.
2. It is greater for God to exist than to not exist.
3. Assume God does not exist.
4. We can conceive a greater being than God.
5. Contradiction.
6. God exists.

Arguably this boils down to the following kind of argument:

The Real Unicorn Argument

Let G be something whose definition entails its own existence (examples include 'the greatest conceivable being' and 'a real unicorn').

1. G exists (definition of G).

Originally Posted by Spenner

I'll have a stab at something that just doesn't quite sit right; the IDEA of God exists in the mind, but I don't believe that fully translates into the essence of God existing in the mind, just the idea of such a thing being conceived. In #2 it's pulled some strings with me by telling me God itself exists in the mind, not merely the projected idea of it, which I don't see being the exact same thing. The mandelbrot fractal as an idea in my mind is different than the actual fractal as if it were to exist and be zooming in precisely in my mind as a reality-bound model of it would, unless I'm dumbing myself down too far.

At this point that's really the only hangnail I can tug at. While it's implied that the idea of God is the same as God, I don't think the mere idea of a 4th dimensional object is the same as a real 4th dimensional object. If I'm highly underestimating the power of "the idea" of something in my sleep deprived state(which I'm pretty sure that I might be) then I'll admit I have nothing else just yet~

I made this post on the first page, which I believe is essentially pointing out the essence of the problem in much less confident terms?

I had it undeleted because... well, I shouldn't have deleted it.

Awesome, yeah... that's definitely the flaw I had in mind, though there may be another, which is equivalent to the flaw in Descartes' proof above. I haven't really thought much about it yet, though, which is why I made the thread... it's easier to think when you can bounce ideas off others.

Looks like the Hofstadter is rubbing off on you after all, anyway.

4 definitely does say "existence therefore greatness"

It states "that which exists in the mind AND reality, is greater than that which exists in the mind alone."

No matter what we can or cannot say about greatness, this is the only claim being made about the nature of greatness and existence in this argument. That is, something which exists is greater than something which does not. Something which exists has more "greatness" that something which does not exist. Therefore "greatness" is an attribute things have by virtue of existing.

The conclusion is "god is great, therefore he exists" which gets the whole thing backwards, as greatness is a quality things have by virtue of their existence. Existence is not, and can not, be a quality something has by virtue of their greatness.

On existence and greatness:
I have an idea for a book. It current exists in my mind alone. Upon completion, the book exists within my mind and in reality. The book attained a higher level of greatness (greatness +1) upon moving from just in my mind to reality. That greatness +1 is a quality the book would possess by virtue of existing. I have an idea, it's a great idea, but that idea only exists in my head. No matter how great that idea is, even if it is infinitely great, there could be no point at which said idea exists anywhere other than between my ears simply by virtue of it's greatness. That is, greatness cannot confer existence, at best existence can confer greatness.

Existence in the mind and reality?
Furthermore, I reject the claim that something can exist in the mind and in reality, the two are never going to be the same thing. I think this was touched on previously but the idea of a chair is not itself a chair. When I look at the chair, the chair does not exist in both my mind and in reality. Technically, the chair only exists in my mind. That is, the reality of the thing which I call a chair, is not a chair. I interpret certain data points, give them context and come to the conclusion that this collection of atoms is something I would classify as a chair. A chair is a symbol for something literal. We do not, and can not, make sense of the world as it literally is. Minds do not deal with the literal, minds deal with the symbolic. No matter how a god might be conceived, the idea of the god will never BE the same as the literal reality of said god. The Xei in my mind, for instance, is not the same Xei in reality, the same Xei in the mind of Photolysis, or even the same Xei in the mind of Xei.


Maxwich and Maxagna:
0. A Maxwich is a maximally great sandwich that is greater than any food.
1. The idea of Maxwich exists in the mind (we can conceive of Maxwich by definition).
2. Thus, Maxwich either exists in the mind alone, or in the mind and reality.
3. It is greater to exist in the mind and reality rather than the mind alone.
4. Thus, if Maxwich exists in the mind alone, we can conceive a greater food, which contradicts the definition of Maxwich.
5. Maxwich exists in reality.

0. A Maxagna is a maximally great lasagna that is greater than any food.
1. The idea of Maxagna exists in the mind (we can conceive of Maxagna by definition).
2. Thus, Maxagna either exists in the mind alone, or in the mind and reality.
3. It is greater to exist in the mind and reality rather than the mind alone.
4. Thus, if Maxagna exists in the mind alone, we can conceive a greater food, which contradicts the definition of Maxagna.
5. Maxagna exists in reality.

The existence of Maxagna contradicts the existence of Maxwich.

Keep in mind that there are also physical limitations to both sandwiches and lasagna which would effect their capacity for greatness, not the least of which is personal tastes for said foods. The greatest conceivable sandwich might not be the greatest possible sandwich, for instance.

I agree as a couple of other people have said that something existing in the mind, that is, having a conception of that something, and something existing, that is, that something actually being present in the world, are two different things, and Anselm's argument works because of a conflation of these two things.

I think Descartes' argument may also work due to a confusion about existence and the mind, although for a different reason.

It's very strange, but I think the final line, "God exists", is true, but does not actually mean that God is a real thing in the world. That seems contradictory, but hopefully I can explain. I think what the final line actually means is that the concept of God must denote something which has the property of existence.

In the same way, the concept of 'unicorn' denotes something which necessarily has a horn. But in order to know whether the horn predicate is actuated - that is, whether there actually exists a unicorn with the horn property - we must first know whether that a unicorn exists, so that there is something to apply the predicate 'has a horn' to. In the case of God, in order to know whether the existence predicate is actuated, we must first know that God exists, so that there is something to apply the predicate 'exists' to.

So again the argument works by messing with concepts. This time, it's not playing with the difference between something existing and the idea of it existing, i.e. being a real concept in the mind. Rather, it's messing with the difference between predicates applied to concepts and predicates applied to reality. I think it's extremely subtle and I'm still trying to fully wrap my head around it... you can see why Descartes' and others were so impressed by it, even though it's admittedly easy to come up with counterexamples to this form of argument.

Do you think this makes sense? If so... do you think it's right?

I see where you're coming from but no, I don't think it's quite right. Granted, I'm an Atheist, so perhaps I'm biased against god(s) but the logic still smells fishy to me. It seems to be defining something into existence and using fancy logic and vagaries to hide that fact.

One of the reasons it seems so odd is that the argument is essentially trying to prove a synthetic statement as if it were an analytic statement. An analytic statement is something which can be proven purely with logic and reasoning. An example would be "there are no square circles". That is an analytic statement. Once the definition of square and circle are established, one can deduce that the two are mutually exclusive. We don't need to look at every square and every circle to establish the truth of this. Synthetic statements cannot be proven with reason alone, they require evidence. "I have a baseball in my pocket" cannot be proven to be true through math. A quick peek inside, however, would do the trick just fine. The statement "god exists" is a synthetic statement, and yet there is no pocket we can look inside to verify it.

On top of it all, getting to "god exists" within the definition of god being maximally great, never gets us to "and his name is Yahweh, he looks like an old white dude with a beard, and he will send you to hell if you don't like him" or any other specifics. This type of god enjoys a comfortable vagueness where it can sit outside the reach of criticism, or even logic.

I think you misunderstand me. I'm agreeing that the logic "smells fishy".

To put it more precisely... I think the syntactics of the argument are correct, but the semantics of the argument are incorrect. The final statement, "God exists", is valid, but its intended interpretation, namely that there is something in the real world which we would describe as "God", is not valid.

An elaboration of what I mean by this is given in my post. Does rereading it, with this comment in mind, help confer my meaning a little better?

god maker.jpg

I have not read the thread, just the original post and wanted to reply this:

I don't believe any ontological claim to the reality or unreality of anything. For me true wisdom is not an ontological position, but epistemology. It is too bad that most western philosophy doesn't place much importance to epistemology, rather it is a means to come up with an ontology.