 Originally Posted by Xei
It's interesting. I wonder though, to what extent information can be preserved through these speculative 'layers' of simulation.
I think there's a simple solution to this problem: lossless data compression algorithms. Briefly, for those not familiar, these work by eliminating the redundancies that are present in data. For example, let's say we have a file which contains 5 instances of an entity we'll call X. X is some package of information, perhaps a paragraph of text, perhaps an image, whatever. One way for us to structure this file would be:
[X X X X X]
That's a lot of redundancy. We can represent this same data (i.e., no loss of information) by structuring the file some way similar to this:
[5 of: X]
Making the very reasonable assumption that it's far more economical to represent the concept "5 of" then it is to represent 4 instances of X, we just reduced our file size dramatically.
The amount of redundancy in our world is staggering. Is it really necessary to code the information for a particular shade of red for every single particle anywhere that reflects light just so? Is it necessary to have complete, separate representations of every single DNA molecule in my body? Sure, some of them are different enough from one another that they deserve to have a separate instance, but how many are exactly the same, only in a different part of my body? How about electrons? The potential for lossless compression is huge enough that I think we can, in principle, simulate multiple universes within ours that are just as informationally rich as our own.
But here's the question: Have we only bought ourselves one extra "level," or is it possible for the compressed, simulated world to do the same thing in turn? 
 Originally Posted by Replicon
it doesn't really matter.
Agreed. The "lucky ones," in my opinion, are not all that lucky.
 Originally Posted by Replicon
His argument is flawed because it assumes the final condition, and then disguises it as a probability. It breaks down into: "ASSUMING the vast majority of entities in existence are simulated, chances are that we are among those entities." That is not the same as saying, "chances are, the majority of entities are simulated." This is pure speculation, and an interesting mental exercise, but it is in no way an argument in favour of the "we live in the Matrix" view.
It's easy to come away with this impression after hearing the relatively informal treatment given it by Chalmers, but I think that the excerpt by Bostrom makes it pretty clear that the argument does not assume its correctness. (And if you're interested, the original philosophical paper is available online here.) It says that if we reject both of the first two propositions, then it is logically incoherent to reject the third proposition. The only two preconditions for this argument which are not made explicit in the above excerpt are that (a) functionalism is true, and (b) it is in principle possible to simulate a universe with the necessary level of detail. As Bostrom points out in his paper, these are both relatively uncontroversial assumptions. The "argument," then is simply that we should acknowledge that there is a nontrivial probability that we are part of a simulation.
We can make a rough estimate of what this probability is. The third proposition is true if and only if both of the first two are false. Both of those propositions probably warrant debates unto themselves, but we can be both nonpartial and conservative by assuming that each is as likely to be true as false. In other words, the probability of each of the first two being true is 50%. Simple probabilistic reasoning then tells us that the probability of the third proposition being true is 25%. We can probably never know the true probability, but it is reasonable to assign a 1 in 4 chance to the possibility that we are right now in a simulation.
 Originally Posted by Replicon
Furthermore, he talks about "living in something like the Matrix" and "The Sims" as if they were analogous, when in fact, they are ENTIRELY different. The big difference being that the Sims cannot exist outside of their universe, and cannot, by definition, "wake up" from their universe. If you are a Sim, and I am the player, and I save my game and turn off the computer for the night, and reload my saved game the next morning, you, as a Sim, do not experience "darkness" or "a storm" or any kind of interruption in your existence that you notice. Why? Because your consciousness is PART of the simulation. The matrix, on the other hand, was a very, very convincing virtual reality video game. The brains that were playing said game were not part of it. You could wake someone up, and they would remember the Matrix.
This is all based on a misunderstanding of the argument -- to be fair, an entirely understandable one considering how Chalmers explained it (in the interview they had been discussing the movie). The simulation argument is not called the Matrix argument, because it's arguing for the possibly that we live in a simulation, not The Matrix(tm). Taken in this light (in which it was intended), these objections disappear.
And thanks for the video -- that was great!
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