Sorry about the multiple post, but this one is dedicated solely to Korittke's intresting post.
Firstly, I reject the notion of qualia. I'll discuss that later.
Mind and brain correlate, that is, their informational content is exactly identical but of a different nature, and neither of them could be said to have causal influence on the other. Instead, they correlate by some universal process that translates neuron-states into mind-states (and vice versa) for no reason.
However, the physical universe has causal influence on the brain. Causal influences on the mind cannot be said to exist because qualia cannot access themselves and thus cannot analyze their qualia-influences. Since the physical universe is causally closed, it shall be assumed that qualia have no causal influences on their own.
I haven't studied casuality very much, but I have heard that someone (was it Kant?) provided a good argument against it. But casuality is a good working hypothesis, I guess. So I'll agree with assuming that casuality exists.
So in your argument above, you are arguing that the brain and the phenomenal mind (the mind as qualia) are related simply through correlation, but not causality? (I hope I'm understanding you right.)
I think that this argument is flawed. If we assume that changes in brain-state, as influenced by physical causality are then mirrored in the mind-state by the universal process, couldn't it then be said that the physical world does have a causal influence on the mind-state? Take the following situation for example:
1. An apple exists on the table in front of me. (physical state)
2. The light reflecting from the apple is detected by my retinae, which in turn send electrical signals to the visual cortex of my brain. (physical state affecting brain state causally)
3. My brain-state of 'seeing apple' is correlated by an informationally identical mind state as the result of the unknown universal process. For ease of discussion, I'll call the unknown universal process the Mirror-Process (I hope you don't disagree.)
So, to sum up what I think you're getting at, the physical state 'apple' causally produces the brain-state 'apple' which in turn produces the mental (qualia) state 'apple', but the mental state and the brain state are not causally linked. Is that right? It is simply a sort of 'mirror process' of correlation...
Why I think this is flawed is this:
If the mind state is informationally identical to the brain state, I assume that if we were to put a banana on the table, our mind state would change to 'banana'. I don't see how this is not a causal relationship, accepting that causality exists. By changing my brain state from 'apple' to 'banana', I am also changing my mind state from 'apple' to 'banana' in light of both states being informationally identical. I could not have the brain state 'apple' and the mind state 'banana'. This is causality - you stated that it occurred because of a 'universal process' - ie. there is some sort of mechanism that is making the mind state and the brain state correlate identically.
I find the idea of a correlation by an unknown process for no reason to be strange. I don't see why such an phenomena should be postulated. Furthermore, let's take a affectual example:
1. I have the mental state 'pick up apple.'
2. The 'mirror process' occurs (uknown universal process).
3. I have the brain state (informationally identical to the mental state) of 'pick up apple'
4. My brain sends the required electrical messages to my arm and, via a causal relation, I:
5. pick up the apple.
Now, there are a few objections to this. Firstly, the problem of causality, as I mentioned before: if I have the mind-state 'pick up apple' which is assumed to be a non-physical 'qualia' process, and I ultimately pick up the apple, which is a physical process, then aren't the two causally linked? This then produces the problem of how a nonphysical state can cause a physical state. I understand that your point is that the mental state and the brain state are not causally related but simply correlated in a mirror-like fashion, but that brings me to my next point. If the brain state and mental state are informationally identical and mirrored in a correlated way, then the brain state produces all that is required to pick up the apple: the brain state of 'pick up apple.' There is no need for a mental 'qualia' state at all - the brain could have done all the work by itself.
So, we have a dilemma. Either:
The brain-state is determined by the mental state, as in the case of picking up the apple. This would be a causal process.
Or,
The brain-state is not determined by the mental qualia state, simply being a mirrored correlate. There is then no need for a qualia state - the brain state can do all the work by itself.
This is really a question of which level of states we assume to be the originator of a 'decision-making process'. When I reach for the apple, does this originate at a qualia-level or a brain-level? If the former, then it can be called a 'causal process' and if the latter, there is no need for qualia at all.
From what you've said about qualia states being unable to access each other, I think you are implying the latter - that the qualia-mind level is a 'projection' if you will of what is going on in the brain level.
I think qualia and other such phenomenalistic notions of consciousness are philosophical illusions. I do think that consciousness can be fully explained through a reductive, scientific approach, whereby qualia are not present at all.
I assume that you've read Nagel's paper What is it like to be a bat? ? He argues that whatever attempts we have at scientifically and reductively explaining consciouness, we will never succeed because of the 'qualia' of what it is like to be a bat...
I disagree with this, and I've written a large essay on it just recently, but I guess I'll discuss it later, my eyes are about to fall out of my head 
Hope I didn't misinterpret you! This should be a good debate!
|
|
Bookmarks