I see. That still leaves the "problem" as pretty trivial, though. If enjoyable experience is the stuff of moral value, as we are tentatively assuming, then of course the "right" thing to do in this scenario is to use the pleasure device. The fact that many people would hesitate to choose this option in actual practice simply tells us that consequentialist ethical theories can sometimes suggest moral actions that seem wrong on an intuitive level--which of course we know already (as previous threads in this forum on the Trolley and Footbridge dilemmas can attest). This clash with intuition does not discredit consequentialism because there is no special reason why intuitive appraisals must be accorded privileged status in determining matters of morality. In fact, I would advance the counter-argument that moral intuitions should be regarded with caution. All formal ethical theories recommend counter-intuitive moral decisions in certain situations, but most of these formal theories are still preferable to purely intuitionist theories because moral intuitions are fickle and subjective.

In short: the measure of an ethical theory is not in how well it accords with intuition.